Buddhist Logic Part 2

By F. Th Stcherbatsky

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Ll therefore cognition representing one type of the article, isn't really to be regarded as a correct cognition whilst the true item has a special shape, e. g. , the yellow conch-shell visible (by the daltonist) isn't a correct cognition of this conch-shell, because it is de facto white. nor is cognition correct while it wrongly represents where of the item, e. g. , the radiance of a jewel noticeable throughout the chink in a door, while unsuitable for the jewel itself that's within the room (behind the door), isn't really a correct cognition of this jewel.

Each attention andevery psychological phenomen zero n are s e If-c zero n sci zero u s. (11. 5). realization easily apprehends (the presence) of an item. psychological phenomena understand certain states of recognition, equivalent to excitement and so forth. 1 it truly is (em:vhasized) that each (flash of) recognition and each particular kingdom of it are self-conscious. certainly excitement and so on. are being essentially skilled and as a result are current to the brain. (Self-consciousness) isn't really itself a (special) psychological phenomenon differing from all others.

A logical cause doesn't produce cognition (of a few unobserved truth) by accident, as e. g. , a lamp (producing wisdom of such unobserved items which it unintentionally occurs to illumine). lO however it produces wisdom (by 1 dharma is the following utilized in the normal (and unique) feel of a high quality belonging to a few substance. It doesn't stick with that the target truth of the types of substance and caliber (dharma. dharmi-bhiiva) is admitted, however the Hrnayiinistic view that there are just dharmas and no dharminB in any respect, that, as Yasomitra places it, 'lJidyamiinam drat;yam (cp.

P. 87. 25. five For the lit. rendering cpo p. 17 n. 6 (text, p. 7. 13). 2 four = = = 6 Dharmakirti obviously makes use of the time period «thing in itself» (8valak~a~a) in additional than one experience. an analogous, as is widely known, has ha. ppened in ecu philosophy. It potential, 1) life absolntely indefinite, no longer even differentiated into topic and item, it really is then griihya-griihaka-kalpanii-apoq,ha-it is absolutely the of the Yo gacaras, the sunyatii in its idealistic belief (budilhy-a;tmii), cp. my Nirvalla, p. 146 fr. , the verses quoted in Sarvad.

L «Sensation and organ and lifestyles is a dt·andva-compoundl>. four. vijniina or vijfiiina-slcandha ability in HInayana solely undifferentiated natural sensation, the mere sensation of the presence of whatever indefinite within the ken of Ollr sense·faculties (prati-vijnapti). it's one point (dha'l'ma), has on its own no kinds, yet distinct into visible, auditional and different sensations in line with tile reason which evoked it. Cpo my Centra. l notion, pp. sixteen and sixty three. within the Mahaylinistic abhidha'l'ma one other vijniina has been imagined.

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